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Every day, millions of financial transactions take place around the world. These 
transactions are the cornerstone of the world’s economy. However, crimes such as money 
laundering and terrorist financing threaten the stability of the financial system. Financial 
Intelligence Units and subject entities work every day to fight these problems. With this in 
mind, this dissertation was developed as a consultancy thesis for a Portuguese financial 
institution and it investigates how Hofstede’s (1983) cultural dimensions influence the 
effectiveness in detecting money laundering and terrorist financing in the compliance 
department of the organization. From the studies conducted, it was possible to infer that 
three of the six dimensions proposed by Hofstede (Individualism vs Collectivism, Power 
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance), have an impact on prevention and detection of 
money laundering and terrorist financing crimes, in that department. Taking the above 
mentioned into consideration, the first suggestion is the continuation of the effort to create 
measures that support communication, within the compliance department. Secondly, a new 
role in the compliance department can be created. This new job would have the 
responsibility of analysing possible flaws with the mechanisms and new ways that 
criminals can use to achieve their ends. Finally, the creation of a new entity with the 
purpose of regulation and managing the compliance profession will be suggested. 
Sumário 
Todos os dias, milhões de transações financeiras são realizadas no mundo inteiro. 
Essas transações são a base da economia mundial. No entanto, crimes como o 
branqueamento de capitais e financiamento do terrorismo ameaçam a estabilidade do 
sistema financeiro. As Unidades de Informação Financeira e entidades sujeitas trabalham 
todos os dias para combater estes problemas. Neste sentido, esta tese de consultoria para 
uma instituição financeira portuguesa, investiga de que forma as dimensões culturais de 
Hofstede (1983) influenciam a eficácia na deteção de branqueamento de capitais e 
financiamento do terrorismo no departamento de compliance de uma instituição financeira 
portuguesa. A partir dos estudos realizados, foi possível inferir que três das seis dimensões 
propostas por Hofstede (Individualismo vs Coletivismo, Distância de Poder e Prevenção de 
Incertezas) têm impacto na prevenção e deteção de crimes de branqueamento de capitais e 
financiamento do terrorismo nesse departamento. Tendo em conta o acima mencionado, a 
primeira sugestão é a continuação do esforço de criação de medidas de apoio à 
comunicação, dentro do departamento de compliance. Em segundo lugar, um novo posto 
neste departamento pode ser criado. Esta nova posição teria a responsabilidade de analisar 
possíveis falhas dos mecanismos de deteção e prevenção e novas formas que os criminosos 
podem usar para alcançar seus fins. Finalmente, será sugerida a criação de uma nova 
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In June of 2015, the Fourth European Union Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
(Fourth Directive) was released. Member States are required to incorporate the Fourth 
Directive into national law by June 26, 2017. This directive provides the guidelines to 
regulate and fight money laundering and terrorist financing in the member states of the 
European Union. The main goal of the Fourth Directive is to strengthen the EU rules against 
money laundering while aligning the international approach with the adoption of 
recommendations, done by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Appendix I), on how to 
fight money laundering and terrorist financing. In Portugal, this directive is expected to be 
transposed by the beginning of 2017, and it will reinforce the Lei n.º 25/2008, de 5 de junho 
(Law 25/2008). This law regulates the duties that subject entities have to follow to prevent 
and detect money laundering crimes. Subject entities are the entities responsible for the 
reporting, to the competent authorities, of operations that can possibly be acts of money 
laundering or terrorist financing. According to the Law 25/2008, subject entities have the 
duties of identification, diligence, refusal, conservation, examination, communication, 
abstention, collaboration, secrecy, control and training (Appendix II). 
The final European Union evaluation of the transposition of the Fourth Directive is 
taking place, in the end of 2016. For this reason, the Portuguese Judiciary Police has 
assembled a team of students from Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics to 
evaluate the transposition of the Fourth Directive into the Portuguese law, before the EU 
evaluation.  
With this in mind, Portuguese culture will be analysed by looking to Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1983) in Portugal and by studying their presence in a 
Portuguese financial institution. Hofstede defined six cultural dimensions that represent 
independent preferences for one state of affairs over another that distinguish countries from 
each other. The dimensions are: i) Individualism vs Collectivism; ii) Uncertainty Avoidance; 
iii) Power Distance; iv) Masculinity vs Femininity; v) Long-term vs Short-term Orientation; 
and vi) Indulgence vs Restraint. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand how 





From the studies conducted in the compliance department of a Portuguese financial 
institution, it was possible to infer that three of the six dimensions proposed by Hofstede have 
an impact on prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes, in 
that department. These dimensions are Individualism vs Collectivism, Power Distance and 
Uncertainty Avoidance. 
This department has shown to have a collectivist culture. This way, communication is 
given special importance and, consequently, it is efficient and well done. Secondly, 
individuals respect the differences in power and status within the department. This has a 
positive influence since it facilitates the decision-making process (whether to report or not). 
Finally, the study also shows that the professionals of the department do not like uncertain 
situation. As a result, there is a clear preference for the existence of rules. Rules provide a 
sense of security from the employees by taking the risk of decision-making from them, since 
they have to comply with the rules. However, due to the profession itself, insecurity and 
instability towards the job still exists. 
Taking the above mentioned into consideration, suggestions were provided with both 
the positive and negative aspects of the findings in mind. The first one is the continuation of 
the effort to create measures that support communication, within the compliance department. 
Secondly, a new role in the compliance department can be created. This new job would have 
the responsibility of analysing possible flaws with the mechanisms and new ways that 
criminals can use to achieve their ends. Finally, the creation of a new entity with the purpose 





2) Money Laundering 
Every day, billions of financial transactions take place around the world. These 
transactions are extremely important to preserve a healthy economy. Within this flow of 
legitimate commerce, are illicit transactions that threaten the stability of the entire financial 
system. Money laundering takes places within our everyday world of routine business 
transactions. Although money laundering can be defined in many ways, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, the definition used will be the one provided by the Directive (EU) 2015/849 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015, where money laundering is 
described as: 
a) “the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of 
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
who is involved in the commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequences 
of that person's action”;  
b) “the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an 
activity”;  
c) “the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that 
such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in 
such an activity”;  
d) “participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions referred to in points 
(a), (b) and (c)”. 
Therefore, it implies the execution of a crime, since otherwise it would not be needed 
to conceal the origins of the proceeds. 
Criminals around the globe use money laundering to mask the origin of their funds, 
making the crimes themselves very difficult to detect. There are many techniques for 
laundering funds. Most of them involve three stages: (1) placement, (2) layering and (3) 




Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2011). 
legitimate financial system. Criminals can do it by depositing cash into a bank account. For 
example, money launderers can divide large amounts of money into smaller portions and 
around different bank accounts in order to complicate the detection process. (2) Layering 
involves converting the proceeds of crime into another form, and creating complex layers of 
financial transactions to obscure the money trail. For example, a criminal might borrow 
against a cash deposit to get a mortgage, creating a transaction that is one layer away from the 
original deposit. (3) Integration involves placing the laundered proceeds back in the economy 
under a veil of legitimacy. The criminal could use the mortgage to buy a house, putting the 
illegal proceeds back into the legitimate economy.  
Terrorist financing uses techniques, similar to those of money launderers, to evade 
authorities and cloud the money trail. As suggested by Greenberg (2002), terrorist funding 
may involve funds from legitimate or criminal sources. Regardless of the origin of their 
money, terrorist financiers often work within the formal banking system, to move funds to 
their final destination. By blending their illicit funds within the traditional financial system, 
even a simple transaction can unknowingly be linked to part of a long-standing criminal 
infrastructure. Whereas money launderers try to hide the origin of the funds, terrorist 
financiers focus on masking the destination of the proceeds, while using the same 
mechanisms. 
Money laundering and terrorist financing can be extremely harmful (McDowell, 
2001). These are not victimless crimes. 
Criminals conduct any manners of 
crimes to generate money: drug 
trafficking, weapons smuggling, fraud, 
theft, kidnapping, extortion, Ponzi 
schemes and market manipulation. 
However, the proceeds of these crimes 
are only of value to the criminals if they 
can convince the public that the funds are 
legitimate. By enabling criminals to 
mask the proceeds of their crimes, 
money laundering facilitates future 
corruption and causes severe harm to 
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social stability and security (McDowell, 2001). The scope of laundered criminal proceeds is 
estimated in billions of dollars worldwide. By undermining the legitimacy of the private 
sector and the integrity of the financial markets, by creating economic distortions and 
instability, by blending illicit funds into the world’s economy, and posing as a reputational 
risk for countries, money laundering is a serious threat to the global economy (Directive (EU) 
2015/849, (2)). As long as money laundering is feasible to criminals, it will continue to play a 
significant role in perpetuating crime. It encourages the criminals to commit the acts that 
produce illicit proceeds, and gives organized crime the funds it needs to conduct further 
criminal activities, including terrorist acts, driving up the social costs of this problem 
(McDowell, 2001). On top of this, as suggested by McDowell (2001), it influences business 
decisions, enhances the risk of default by banks, takes control of economic policy away from 
the government, harms a country’s reputation, and increases the exposure of people to crimes 
such as drug trafficking. It is extremely important to our global security and stability that we 
put a stop to a flow of illegitimate assets. 
As reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in what concerns the 
size of this problem worldwide, it is estimated that, in 2009, all criminal proceeds accounted 
for 3,6% of the global GDP, representing US$2.1 trillion, and from this, US$1.6 trillion was 
available to launder, corresponding to 2.7% of global GDP. That said, the best estimates for 
the total amount of laundered money in 2009, point for US$1.6 trillion, or 2,7% of global 
GDP. However, the interception rate remains low at the global level. It is estimated that only 
0,2% of the money laundered through the financial system are seized and frozen (Figure 1). 
In the past year, the Global Economic Crime Survey, conducted by PwC, reported that 36% 
of the companies surveyed were victims of economic crime (Figure 2). This was the first 
time, since the global financial crisis in 2008 that this rate has decreased.  







3) Terrorist Financing 
In the Directive (EU) 2015/849 terrorist financing is defined as “the provision or 
collection of funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they be used 
or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the 
offences within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA (1)”. 
Fund raising might be the backbone of every terrorist organization. Without funds, 
these organizations would not be sustainable and would not be able to have the necessary 
resources to pursue their activities. Thus, it is crucial for terrorist organizations to raise 
money, and they do it from a variety of sources and move it in many different manners. 
Let us take al-Qaeda’s example. In what concerns its structure, al-Qaeda is 
decentralized, compartmentalized, flexible, and diverse in its methods and targets. 
Nevertheless, by analysing their financial network we can see that it is characterized by 
layers and redundancies. The money is raised from different sources and they move it in a 
variety of ways. They use the global financial system, the Islamic banking system, and the 
underground Hawala system, among other money transfer mechanisms to move around their 
money (Greenberg et al, 2002). 
However, how exactly are these funds raised? As indicated by Greenberg, the network 
of corporations that Osama bin Laden was able to create when he lived in Sudan, or the 
honey traders in Yemen, are examples of legitimate businesses ran by the organization, 
providing them a cloak of legitimacy under which they can operate. On the other hand, we 
have funds originating from criminal enterprises. Some of these come from the relationship 
al-Qaeda has with the heroin trade in Afghanistan. The profits earned from both the 
legitimate and illegitimate businesses are laundered, in order to hide the destination of the 
funds and then channelled to terrorist ends. Local cells are also encouraged to be financially 
self-sufficient and often engage in crimes like theft and fraud (Greenberg et al, 2002). 
However, the financial backbone of al-Qaeda’s structure are the funds raised through 
the foundation of charities, non-governmental organizations, mosques, websites, fund-raisers, 




duties like the zakat. The zakat presupposes that all Muslims have to give at least 2,5 percent 
of their income to humanitarian causes, which the lack of regulation and documentation make 
an easy target for terrorist groups to take advantage of. In fact, al-Qaeda is not the only 
terrorist organization to use these mechanisms. Reports have suggested that terrorist 






4) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention and 
Detection 
 The prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing is 
coordinated by the Financial Intelligence Units (FIU). The FIUs are the central national 
agencies with the responsibility to receive, request, analyse and diffuse, to the competent 
authorities, financial intelligence (Unidade de Informação Financeira, 2015). This 
information regards proceeds from crimes, potential financing to terrorism and information, 
mandatory by law, to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. They are also requested 
to cooperate internationally with each other in order to detect and prevent money laundering 
and terrorist financing. This way, when coordinating the fight against the issues being 
studied, the FIUs use the guidelines provided by the European Union. 
In May 2015, the European Parliament and Council released the Directive (EU) 
2015/849. This is the fourth directive publish with the goal of fighting money laundering and 
terrorist financing. It was preceded and built on the Directive 2005/60/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005, the Third Directive. 
The goal of the Third Directive was to include new concepts, reinforce others and 
establish new guidelines in the fight of the crimes being studied. The first and most relevant 
point that this directive brought up was the inclusion of the concept of terrorist financing in 
addition to money laundering. The first two directives covering this matter only had in 
consideration the fight against money laundering. With the directive published in 2005, the 
concept of terrorist financing was considered to be related with money laundering, thus, 
included in it. In addition, the directive reinforced four duties: the duties of identification, 
diligence, report and cooperation. Moreover, it introduces the concept of Politically Exposed 
Person (PEP). A PEP is someone who has been entrusted with an important public function, 
or is an immediate family member or someone known to be a close associate of such civil 
servant (Directive (EU) 2005/60/EC, art. 3, (8)). The third directive also reinforces the idea of 
a Risk Based Approach when dealing with these crimes. 
Besides the third directive, the EU also took under consideration the 
recommendations provided by the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT). This organization 




implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to fight money laundering, 
terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial 
system. The FAFT recommendations are accepted as the international standard in the fight 
against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
With this in mind, the latest Directive enables an easier interpretation of requirements, 
and gives clarity on aspects that could be ambiguous. The Fourth Directive introduced some 
updates on what financial institutions should do. It provides more explicit guidelines for the 
implementation of Risk Based Approach, ongoing monitoring, Customer Due Diligence and 
PEP practices, includes the concept of Beneficial Ownership and analyses FIU’s rights and 
duties. Member states have up to two years to transpose this Directive into national 
legislation, starting from the finalization of the new legislation from the EU. Due to these 
new requirements, subject entities should ensure that they are prepared for the proposed 
changes, and have measures in place to train staff, update policies and procedures, and 





5) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Portugal 
In order to study money laundering and terrorist financing, it is important to reduce 
the scope, and because this dissertation focuses on Portugal, it is important to analyse the 
Portuguese situation. 
In Portugal, drug trafficking, corruption, art and cultural artefacts, extortion, frauds, 
tax offences and illegal immigration are the crimes more often associated with money 
laundering (Unger et al., 2013). In 2009, it was estimated that the proceeds from crime 
reached €2.009 million, being that the amount of money that could be laundered, 
corresponding to 1,27% of the GDP (Unger et al., 2013). 
In the Corruption Perceptions Index1, Portugal is ranked the 28th in a global level. In 
2015, 10.139 cases were reported to the Portuguese Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Data 
from the Portuguese FIU’s annual report from 2015 indicates that from these, 1.248 were 
investigated and 471 were confirmed to be cases of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
which represents roughly 5% of the reported situations. From these 471 confirmed cases, the 
FIU proposed a suspension of €48.703.111,12, US $9.020.698,52 and GB £100.156,52. On 
top of this, the investigations were coordinated among FIUs of other countries. Amongst 
these, the countries most involved were Luxemburg, Spain and United Kingdom.  
It is also important to analyse how the number of reports evolved in the past years. In 
2012, 8.461 communications were sent to the FIU. From these, 745 inquiries were opened 
and 512 suspicions were confirmed. In the following year, the number of reports decreased to 
7.554 and the number of confirmed suspicions also decreased to 446. However, in 2014 and 
2015, the number of communications sent to the authorities would increase in both years. In 
2014, it increased by 21%, comparing to the previous year, and in 2015 this number was 
10.139 communications. Over these four years, the number of opened inquiries continued to 
increase, reaching a volume of 1.248 in 2015. Regarding the amount of confirmed suspicions, 
this number decreased from 512 in 2012 to 439 in 2014, growing by 32 in 2015. 





Source: Unidade de Informação Financeira, 2012-2015 
Source: Unidade de Informação Financeira, 2012-2015 
If we look at these numbers in Figure 3, from a perspective of how many of the 
communications received by the FIU are confirmed to be suspicious, we can verify that the 
effectiveness is low. In 2012, the percentage of received communications that turned out to 
be confirmed as suspicious was 6,05%. In 2015, this percentage was at 4,65%. The reason for 
this reduction is the larger amount of reports received by the FIU and the lower confirmation 
of suspicious cases comparing to 2012. 
Figure 3 – Communications received by the FIU 
 





Considering this information, why did the number of communications increase in the 
years under analysis? The main responsibles for this change are the Supervision and 
Financial Entities (Figure 4). These include credit institutions, exchange agencies, payment 
institutions, insurance companies, the Bank of Portugal, among others. The number of 
communications by this group went from 31% of the total number of reports, in 2012, to 45% 
in 2015, being the group that reports the most. 
Financial Intelligence Units are the central national units with the objective of 
receiving, centralizing and diffusing intelligence regarding the prevention and investigation 
of money laundering, terrorist financing and tax related crimes. As explained by the Inspector 
Miguel Trindade Rocha2, the structure and way of acting of a FIU can follow one of four 
types of models: (1) the administrative model, in which the FIU is included in a regulatory or 
supervision entity, or established as an independent administrative authority; (2) the law 
enforcement model, where the FIU is connected to a police agency, whether general or 
specialized; (3) the judicial or prosecutorial model, where the agency is affiliated with a 
judicial authority or the prosecutor’s office; (4) or the hybrid model, in which the FIU follows 
a combination of the before-mentioned three. 
The Portuguese FIU follows the law enforcement model. This type of FIU structure 
allows for the access to other databases, like police, national and international databases, and 
enables for a faster police reaction. On the other hand, the disadvantages associated with this 
type of FIU, are related with the level of confidence between subject entities and the 
authorities, making a relationship of trust and cooperation necessary for a better flow of 
information.  
Money laundering prevention is done in three stages. The first one is prevention, 
which consists in reducing the risk of financial criminality, through controls that prevent 
fraudulent actions. The second stage is present in a later phase of money laundering, and 
consists in detecting it. Finally, controlling entities resort to repression by applying corrective 
measures and repairing the damage caused by the crime. 
However, because this dissertation focuses on the prevention and detection phases, it 
is important to define the process of prevention and detection of money laundering crimes. 
                                                          
2 Miguel Trindade Rocha is an inspector in the Financial Information Unit of the Portuguese Judiciary Police, 
with many years of experience in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. He was the 




The first step is done by subject entities. These entities often have mechanisms that issue 
alerts when suspicious transactions are done. If we use banks as an example, these 
organizations have built mechanisms in which, based on the characteristics of the transaction 
and other factors, an alert is issued. After these issues, the elements of the compliance office 
analyse the operation, in order to decide if it is in fact suspicious or not, and communicate it 
to the FIU. This is the critical step that this dissertation is trying to analyse. In this part of the 
process, the individuals taking part in it have to make a decision. This decision is subject to 
the influence of the personality of the individual, to the environment and culture of the 
company, and to the national culture, that influences the decision making directly, by 
affecting the individual, and indirectly, by affecting corporate culture and environment. 
Therefore, the individual chooses whether to report or not to report the operation to the FIU. 
After receiving the information about the suspect operations, the FIU has the responsibility to 
treat and analyse the information, disseminate the reports, return the treated information and 
elaborate statistics. If the suspicion is confirmed, the information will be forwarded to the 
Attorney General of the Republic, who will investigate the matter. 
In a perfect case scenario, assuming that money laundering is a variable, the level of 
maximum efficiency would be achieved. This means that from all the alerts issued, all the 
illegal operations would be part of them. From these alerts, only and all the illegal operations 
would be communicated to the FIU, reducing in this way the workload of FIU inspectors, and 
maximizing the number of illegal activities identified. Finally, from the communications to 
the FIU, all of them would be illegal operations, and no illegal operation would be left 
unidentified.  
However, this scenario is almost, if not completely, unachievable. The alerts issued 
are identified by searching for indicators and typologies (Appendix III). Later these alerts are 
analysed by individuals who chose whether to report or not to report to the authorities. 
Consequently, the individuals who detect and report these crimes are exposed to the culture 
and ethical values of the place that condition their behaviours, more specifically the country, 
the sector and the company they are inserted in. By being exposed to a certain culture, an 
individual allows that culture to influence their values, behaviours and thoughts. As a result, 
those same values influence the individual’s decision-making. Thus, the cultural aspect of a 
nation plays an important role in the behaviours of individuals (Hofstede, 1983), and 





6) Defining Culture 
Over the years, studies have suggested that national cultures have influence on 
management (Hofstede, 1983). To be more precise, Hofstede (1983) defines three levels at 
which culture is important to management. The first is at a political level. Nations are 
political units with their own forms of government, legal systems and labour unions, affecting 
in different ways management. Secondly, at the sociological level, culture has a symbolic 
value to citizens. Individuals derive part of their identity from the culture of the country they 
grow in, giving them a sense of belonging to the community. The third aspect is 
psychological. An individual’s thinking is partly conditioned by national culture factors, as 
stated by Hofstede (1983). 
Culture is a very complex concept, and so, we cannot use a single definition. In fact, 
there are more than 160 definitions of culture (Treven et al, 2008). One of the earliest 
definitions was proposed by Edward B. Tylor (1871). He describes culture as “a complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, custom, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by a man as a member of a society”. However, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, the definition proposed by Geert Hofstede in 1983 will be used. The author 
describes national culture as a “collective mental programming”. It is part of an individual’s 
conditioning that is shared with other members of the same nation, region or group but not 
with members of other nations, regions or groups. Meanwhile, characterizing a national 
culture does not mean that every individual will act accordingly to how it is defined, and that 
every individual within that culture is mentally programmed in the same way. In fact, the 
national culture is kind of an average pattern of beliefs and values, around which individuals 
from a given country are expected to vary (Hofstede, 1983). Furthermore, the country scores 
on these dimensions are relative, meaning that culture can only be used by comparison. 
In 1983, Hofstede focused his attention on work-related values while studying culture. 
The study conducted by this author, aggregated data from more than 116,000 IBM employees 
from 40 countries. From this study, Hofstede defined four dimensions to explain differences 
among cultures. Although the data used in the study is from the 1970s, recent studies have 
confirmed Hofstede’s findings, with minor differences (Treven et al, 2008), and two more 




The first dimension is Individualism versus Collectivism. It reflects whether the 
preferred way to deal with issues is through an individual or collective action. In cultures 
high on individualism, individual needs, concerns and interests are emphasized over those of 
the group. On the other hand, in cultures oriented to collectivism the opposite is true. 
Everyone is expected to look after the needs, concerns and interests of the in-group. There is 
statistical proof that the level of individualism in one country is positively related to the 
countries’ wealth. 
Power Distance is the second dimension, and explains how society deals with the fact 
that people are unequal in what concerns power, wealth and status. This dimension is related 
to the degree of centralization of power and the degree of autocratic leadership. Cultures high 
on Power Distance accept high levels of difference in power and authority between members, 
whereas, low power distance cultures do not. Collectivist countries always show large power 
distance, while Individualist countries do not always score low on Power Distance. 
Thirdly, there is Uncertainty Avoidance. This dimension measures how society deals 
with the uncertain characteristics of the future. In some societies, people are more willing to 
take risks than in others. In these societies, people tend to feel relatively secure. Societies that 
score low on Uncertainty Avoidance show these characteristics. On the other hand, in 
societies that score high in this dimension there will be a higher level of anxiety, translating 
into greater nervousness, emotionality and aggressiveness. These societies tend to prefer rules 
and operate in seemingly predictable situations. 
The fourth dimension is Masculinity versus Femininity which attributes values 
associated with masculinity and femininity to different cultures. Characteristics associated 
with masculinity are aggressiveness and dominance, and in societies that score high in 
masculinity, there is a strong emphasis on achievement, growth and challenge in jobs. In 
these cultures, people tend to be more assertive and not showing as much concern for 
individual needs and feelings. There is also a higher concern for job performance. On the 
other hand, in societies strong in the feminine dimension, factors like working conditions, job 
satisfaction and employee participation are more valued. 
After publishing the paper where Hofstede introduces the cultural dimensions, the 
author later added a fifth dimension, Long-term versus Short-term Orientation. It reflects how 




concerned with the future and they plan for the long-term, giving importance to their savings 
and persistence. On the other hand, short-term oriented cultures value the present more, and 
show more concern about answering to their social obligations. 
Finally, the dimension more recently included, is Indulgence vs Restraint. According 
to this dimension, an indulgent society is one that allows relatively free gratification of basic 
and natural core human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. One example of this 
would be a society where an individual feels more predisposed to buy himself/herself a treat 
after accomplishing a goal. On the other hand, a restrained society is one that suppresses the 





7) Portuguese Culture 
 After having defined the cultural dimensions, it is important to analyse them using 
“Portuguese goggles”. By doing so, it is possible to get a good overview of the drivers and 
traits that might influence the detection of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. 
 Staring with Individualism vs Collectivism, this dimension measures the degree of 
interdependence within the members of the society. Whether the decision-making is done 
with the “We” or the “I” in mind. Like in most of the European countries, Portugal has a low 
score of 27 on Individualism. It is, therefore, a Collectivist society. This translates into a 
close and long-term commitment to the individual’s in-group, being that the family, extended 
family or other relationships. Loyalty plays a very important role. In this type of societies, 
strong relationships are developed, and everyone takes responsibility for other members of 
the group. Offence leads to shame and loss of face, employer/employee relationships are 
perceived almost as a family link and hiring and promotion decisions are done taking into 
account the employee’s in-group. 
 In what concerns Power Distance, this dimension deals with the extent to which 
individuals accept the differences in power and status in the society. Portugal has a score of 
63 in this dimension, meaning that hierarchical distance is accepted and the one in the top 
positions have privileges for that. The boss requires information from the subordinates and 
they expect to be controlled by the boss. Showing lack of interest for a subordinate can lead 
to the demotivation of the employee, and at the same time, negative feedback is very 
distressing for him. For this reason, the subordinate has a hard time coming to the boss with 
negative information.  
 Uncertainty Avoidance is the degree to which the members of a certain society deal 
and feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty and ambiguity bring 
anxiety with them, and different cultures deal with it differently. If there is a dimension that 
better defines Portugal, this is the one. This country has a score of 99, which is one of the 
highest in this dimension. Nations that try to avoid uncertainty have rigid codes of beliefs and 
behaviour and are intolerant to unorthodox ideas and behaviours. There is an emotional need 




there might be some resistance to innovation and security is important for the motivation of 
the individual. 
 The Masculinity vs Femininity dimension tells what motivates people the most, 
wanting to be the best (Masculine), or liking what they do (Feminine). Portugal has a low 
score of 31 on Masculinity. This means that its culture is more likely to be driven by 
Feminine stereotypes. In this type of cultures consensus is important, and it is reached 
through involvement. Polarization or excessive competitiveness are not well received. 
Managers strive for consensus, people value equality, solidarity and quality in their working 
lives. Conflict is managed by compromising and negotiating. People favour incentives such 
as free time and flexibility, and the focus is on well-being, not status.  
 The fifth dimension, Long-term vs Short-term Orientation describes how cultures 
maintain links with the past while dealing with the challenges of the future. In this dimension, 
Portugal has a low score of 28, showing that there is a preference for a normative thought 
rather than pragmatic. Portuguese people have a strong concern with establishing the truth, 
and show a great respect for tradition. They also show a small propensity to accumulate 
savings and people in this country are focused on achieving quick results. 
Finally, Indulgence vs Restraint stands for the extent to which people try to control 
their desires and impulses. With a score of 33 on Indulgence, Portugal is considered a 
restrained country. There is a tendency for cynicism and pessimism in these cultures. 
Cultures characterized by restraint do not put much emphasis on leisure time and control the 
gratification of their desires. People with this orientation have the perception that their actions 






 In order to study the impact of the Portuguese culture in preventing and detection 
money laundering and terrorist financing, I conducted interviews in a Portuguese financial 
institution in which the compliance activity would have an impact in how the organization 
operated. This institution3 is a perfect match for the purpose of this dissertation since, due to 
the various services it provides, it is quite exposed to the risk of money laundering and 
terrorist financing. On top of this, this organization was mentioned by individuals of the 
Portuguese FIU, as an interesting case study for this dissertation. 
 The conducted interviews had a semistructured format. A protocol with open-ended 
questions (Appendix IV) was prepared, as a way to capture the presence of certain 
characteristics related to the dimensions being studied and how they would influence the 
compliance activity of that department. Given the interviewees answers, if it made sense, 
related questions would be asked. By making open-ended questions and adding new 
questions from the ones in the protocol, the inquired people were able to reflect about this 
topic and reach their own conclusions. The interviewees in question were the Chief 
Compliance Officer (CCO), the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) and the 
Money Laundering Reporting Officer Assistant (MLRO Assistant). Besides these individuals, 
two more employees from the compliance department were invited to discuss how the 
Portuguese culture influences the prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
 While interviewing the CCO, I wrote down his answers and my reflections and, in the 
other interviews, I audio-recorded the full interviews. This allowed me to better analyse the 
interviews and try to understand the link and causality nexus between the six dimensions 
proposed by Hofstede and the process of preventing and detection money laundering and 
terrorist financing in this financial institution. 
                                                          
3 I signed a confidentiality agreement, which does not allow me to disclose information that might lead to the 






After interviewing elements of the compliance office of a Portuguese bank, it was 
possible to draw conclusions that support some of the previous assumptions. Using the 
cultural dimensions model defined by Hofstede, the interviews show evidence that support 
the hypothesis that Portuguese culture can influence the detection phase of money laundering 
crimes and terrorist financing in three of the previously mentioned dimensions. The 
conclusions that can be derived from the interviews are that the dimensions Individualism vs 
Collectivism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance have an influence in the detection 
of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes in Portugal. Regarding the dimensions 
Masculinity vs Femininity, Long-term vs Short-Term Orientation and Indulgence vs Restraint, 
the interviews resulted in no evidence that there is a direct influence in the crimes being 
study. However, future investigations can further study these dimensions with focus on these 
crimes in Portugal. 
The interviews began with the explanations of the compliance department’s structure. 
In the past year, this department has suffered some structural changes. Currently, the 
Compliance department employs over 50 people. The head of the department is the CCO and 
below this person are the heads of each of the sub-divisions. These divisions had the shared 
responsibility to do the entire compliance mandated by law and complement it in other ways. 
This structure has suffered some changes. With these changes, the internal audit and control 
stopped being a responsibility of the compliance department and the business ethics of the 
organization was further developed. From these developments, a new code of conduct 
transverse to the entire company was drawn up. In addition, the policy of conflict of interests 
was improved, as well as the Know Your Customer (KYC) and Know Your Transaction 
(KYT) processes. However, the interviews and analysis were focused on the department 
responsible for the communication and reporting to the competent authorities, the Prevention 
and Detection of Money Laundering division. This division employs around half of the total 
number of employees of the Compliance department. 
As mentioned before, the Prevention and Detection of Money Laundering division is 
the one responsible for identifying the suspicious transactions and report them to the 
competent authorities. More specifically, the people responsible for the reporting and had the 




the MLRO, and is the MLRO’s superior, these decisions are made together. As confirmed by 
the MLRO, although the CCO is the one with largest formal power, “(…) the decision to 
report or not is a joint decision, so we need to communicate daily”. 
The reason for this is the background of both of these professionals. On the one hand, 
the CCO is a professional with a large number of years in the company. He has a very good 
knowledge of the functional areas of the organization and has the necessary experience and 
knowledge about compliance. On the other hand, the MLRO is an expert in the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing subjects and his level of expertise on these matters is 
higher than the CCO. Therefore, his opinion is always taken in high consideration. As the 
CCO mentions, “In case of doubt, I trust the opinion of the MLRO. (…) He has more 
experience than me in compliance.”. 
When evaluating Individualism vs Collectivism it is important to assess if the 
dimension’s evaluation is in accordance with Hofstede’s results and to know its possible 
implications. Individualism vs Collectivism evaluates the relation between an individual and 
his own in-group. It measures the level to which each person prefers to take an individual or 
collective action to deal with issues. In individualistic societies, ties between individuals are 
very loose and each person is expected to look after his/her own self-interest and the interest 
of his/her immediate family. This only happens because society gives a large amount of 
freedom to individuals. On the other hand, in collectivistic societies, everyone is expected to 
look after the needs, concerns and interests of the in-group and the ties between individuals 
are very tight.  
In this dimension, Portugal scores 27 on Individualism, characterizing it as a 
collectivistic society. This translates into a close and long-term commitment to the 
individual’s in-group, being that the family, extended family or other relationships. Loyalty 
plays a very important role. In this type of societies, strong relationships are developed, and 
everyone takes responsibility for other members in the group. Offence leads to shame and 
loss of face, employer/employee relationships are perceived almost as a family link and 
hiring and promotion decisions take into account the employee’s in-group. 
When one mentions the impact that this dimension has in an organization, more 
precisely in a compliance department, those can be seen at the frequency of communication, 




workers, the kind of relationships between members of the department and, most importantly, 
how is the decision to report or not made, if it is a decision of an individual or a rather 
collective decision. 
The conducted interviews provide evidence to confirm that the department under 
study has a rather collectivistic culture. Not surprisingly, it goes in accordance with the 
Portuguese culture. In this specific compliance department, there is a high degree of 
communication. Communication is considered essential to perform the job and, as said by the 
MLRO, “In a department of detection and prevention of money laundering with over 20 
employees, if there is no communication, everything will fail”. The same person reinforced 
the importance of communication with “The individual who is not able to stop for a second 
and share important information to his/her colleague, I doubt that person will work for a long 
time with me”. Therefore, communication is a frequently used and important practice in the 
department. To this, the MLRO Assistant adds, “communication is crucial to make the right 
decision”. 
In general, the interviewees admit that the communication is done in a very informal 
way. As the MLRO states, “The communication happens in a very informal way, and this is 
helped by the fact that everyone works in an open-space and everyone is involved in every 
step of the process”. Furthermore, the MLRO Assistant considers that employees 
“communicate internally in the most outright way possible”. 
Consequently, all the communication process influences the decision-making. Before 
arriving to the CCO and the MLRO, the report of the suspect operation has passed through 
many people who have decided that this operation should be considered to be reported to the 
competent authorities. The information sharing is an important characteristic that is 
encouraged in the department. This way, even though the CCO and MLRO have the final 
word, everyone is included in the decision-making. This way more perspectives and insights 
are gathered and when a tough decision is to be made, these different perspectives and 
insights are helpful for the discussion. As the MLRO Assistant says, “It is important that the 
decision is reached in a participative and inclusive way and it is important for everyone to 
have the freedom to disagree”. Therefore, by having a collectivist culture, it is possible to 
have access to more information and to have a more efficient and more precise decision-




The second dimension studied was Power Distance. This dimension reflects how 
society deals with the fact that people are unequal. That is reflected in power, status and 
wealth differences, therefore, this dimension analyses the degree of centralization of power 
and autocratic leadership, and to what point does society accept those differences. Cultures 
high on Power Distance accept high levels of difference in power and authority between 
members, whereas, low Power Distance cultures do not have such tolerance. Collectivist 
countries always show large Power Distance, while Individualist countries do not always 
score low on Power Distance (Hofstede, 1983). 
This last statement is true in Portugal. Considered as a collectivist country, Portugal 
has a score of 63 in Power Distance, meaning that differences in power, status and wealth are 
accepted to some extent. Consequently, hierarchical distance is accepted and the ones in the 
top positions have privileges that come with the position. The boss requires information from 
the subordinates and they expect to be controlled by the boss. Showing lack of interest for a 
subordinate might lead to the demotivation of the employee, and at the same time, negative 
feedback is very distressing for him. For this reason, the subordinate has a hard time coming 
to the boss with negative information. 
When applying the concept of Power Distance to the detection and prevention of 
money laundering and terrorist financing crimes, it should be analysed to what point 
employees in the Compliance department accept the differences in power within the 
organization, meaning, to what point are differences in power in the hierarchy of the 
company accepted. 
From the interviews, it was possible to find that, although the employees share the 
same workspace and there is a preference for a more horizontal structure, in order to optimize 
the information flow in terms of speed, all the employees seem to accept the differences in 
power within the organization. This argument can be clearly confirmed by one of the 
interviewed employees who said that in his sub-division his superior “taught me that this is a 
democracy, but he is the boss. (…) In the same way that there are rules, there must be 
someone to impose the rules and say that if something needs to be done in a certain way, it 
needs to be done that way”. On top of this, the MLRO Assistant is of the opinion that “there 
needs to be a voice to transmit authority”. He also supports the idea of a more horizontal 
structure that “facilitates the information flow and avoids disclaiming responsibility” from 




says that it is going to be that way because he says so, I will respect the formality of his 
authority”. Although the decision-making process is done in a collective way, the final word 
and the norms are established by the top of the hierarchy, existing this way a combination of 
collectivism and acceptance for the differences in power and status within this organization. 
All these arguments support Hofstede’s conclusion that, like in Portugal, in this 
department, power, status and wealth differences are accepted. However, there is one specific 
situation when this evidence does not confirm the presence of Power Distance in this 
department. More specifically, this happens when the specialist in the detection and 
prevention of the crimes under analysis is not the person on top of the hierarchy. In this 
organization’s case, the specialist was the MLRO, the second in command. For this reason, 
the final decision, whether to report or not, was a joint decision between the CCO and the 
MLRO. However, as both of them stated, they communicate in a daily basis and always reach 
consensus.  
Communication with the competent authorities and amount of information sent to 
them are two very important variables when preventing and detecting these issues. It is 
important to exist a constant flow of information between authorities and subject entities in 
order to accelerate the decision process to suspend or not the operation. On the other hand, 
because of the overload of information that the authorities receive from all the subject 
entities, it is important to be selective in which operations to report or not, in order to speed 
up the process. 
By imposing hierarchical differences, the compliance office of this organization is 
able to better respond to the points previously mentioned, also because the law was discussed 
and analysed before being implemented.  Acting in accordance to the law helps the 
organization being aligned with the external factors influencing the prevention and detection 
of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. 
The final dimension in which was found evidence that it can influence the detection 
and prevention of money laundering crimes is Uncertainty Avoidance. It is the degree to 
which the members of a certain society deal and feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Cultures weak on Uncertainty Avoidance are able to accept this truth and not 
become upset by it. In these cultures the individuals are likely to take risks more easily, they 




behaviours because they will not feel threatened. In the opposite case, societies high on 
Uncertainty Avoidance show higher levels of anxiety and nervousness. These societies prefer 
rules and try to act in predictable ways in order to reduce the ambiguity. In a society that has 
these norms embedded, people prefer stable jobs and a secure life, they avoid conflict and 
show less tolerance to different ideas and behaviours. 
Portugal is a country with one of the highest scores in this dimension. With a score of 
99, the Portuguese culture tends to show rigid codes of beliefs and behaviour and is intolerant 
to unorthodox ideas and behaviour. There is an emotional need for rules, whether they work 
or not, people have an inner need to be busy and work hard, there might be some resistance to 
innovation and security is important for the motivation of the individual. 
According to Hofstede (1983), two possible ways to create a sense of security are 
technology and law. When building security through technology, the compliance department 
under analysis uses a computer system to detect operations that might seem suspicious. For 
this, the MLRO reinforces that one of his main concerns is “making sure that our activity [in 
the compliance department] is backed, in an optimizing way, by the machines and scrutiny 
tools”. The MLRO Assistant complements this idea by saying that “If I only have three 
clients to control it would be easy. However, due to the enormous amount of transactions that 
we have to analyse, it would be impossible to do with only human labour. The machines are a 
necessity to process all the volume of transactions”. 
To create security, this department also uses the law, in the broadest sense of the 
word. Through the laws, formal rules and norms of the organization, it is possible to create a 
protection from the unpredictability of human behaviour. As the MLRO states, “(…) any 
detection or prevention activity has to be embodied in regulations. (…)”. When inquiring one 
of the employees of the department, it was possible to verify that the same opinion was 
sustained when this person mentioned, “There should be rules in everything. Now, who 
defines them depends. If we are talking about a company, there should be a hierarchical chain 
to define them. Within those rules, there should be given freedom to discuss them with a 
constructive spirit. (…) But the rules have to be followed”. It is possible to conclude that 
there are two reasons why the laws that regulate these issues are used as the basis of the work 
of the compliance department. The first is because its formal power over the organizations is 
respected. The second is the fact that there is a preference for the existence of rules and 




now face less risk of suffering repressive measures (such as fines) from the competent 
authorities and have guidelines to perform their activity. Hence, it is possible to verify that 
often a country with strong Uncertainty Avoidance is likely to have large Power Distance. 
Hofstede (1983) confirmed this fact when he identified a cluster of countries with these 
characteristics. In fact, Portugal was included in this group of countries that was mainly 
composed by Latin countries. 
In the compliance department of this organization, the law is the first thing to be 
considered when analysing an operation. As stated by the MLRO “We follow the law 
directives to do our analysis. However, the law is always the basis of our work and starting 
from it, we build and develop our detection and prevention systems. (…) It is based on the 
directives given by the law that we find operations that might be suspicious”.  The same 
person also mentioned, “The compliance officers have a crucial role in the implementation of 
the legal framework and have to make decisions within it”. From these quotes, we can 
conclude that the law is always basis of the detection and prevention system and is always 
respected. It is possible to see that from a perspective that analyses the law, the hierarchical 
differences are accepted. However, even though “the law exists and encompasses everything 
we do”, the MLRO states that “according to the Risk Based Approach framed in the 4th 
Directive, I can opt to report or not report”. This shows that the law gives freedom of 
decision to the subject entities, putting more responsibility on them. By complying as much 
as possible with the law, this department is able to be less prone to risks of this activity. 
Being true that the Portuguese culture prefers a society with rules, in order to feel 
secure and decrease the perceived risk, these are not the only ways in which Uncertainty 
Avoidance can influence the detection and prevention of money laundering crimes and 
terrorist financing. In order for the rules to be effective and provide the sense of security 
discussed previously, they need to be clear. In general, the interviewees argue that the laws 
and regulations that rule  this sector could be clearer. The first evidence for this argument is 
the opinion of the CCO that says, “(…) this sector is highly regulated”. Meanwhile, the 
MLRO is of the opinion that “(…) the Law 25/2008 generally is clear. However, when the 
Bank of Portugal tried to complement and regulate this law, they made it more complex by 
establishing a set of parameters that the law does not specify. (…) No law is clear at all times. 
Laws exist to be interpreted”. As for the MLRO Assistant, the opinion is that “The laws [that 




have the necessary controls to avoid money laundering and terrorist financing crimes from 
happening”. By reading these statements, one can understand that the compliance officers 
would feel more comfortable if the regulations of the compliance sector would give them 
specific guidelines to address these issues. However, by doing this, the legal authorities could 
be cancelling the flexibility for the subject entities to react to unpredicted situations. As 
mentioned by the MLRO Assistant “On the one hand, being selfish, the more parameterized 
the report criteria are the better. This way we are more protected. On the other hand, than can 
lead to problems of over reporting to the FIU with information that sometimes might be 
unnecessary”. 
It is a fact that the law exists to be interpreted and that the compliance departments 
built their systems in accordance to their interpretation of the law. However, some situations 
cannot be predicted. When asked what their actions would be in a case like this, the answers 
were that these operations were likely to be reported. As the MLRO states “If it is relevant, it 
has to start being predicted. The detection and prevention mechanisms have to be adapted. If 
the occurrence is anomalous, it is managed in terms of control, risk mitigation and eventual 
report”. This shows a transference of responsibility from the compliance department to the 
competent authorities, in order to eliminate the risk from this uncertain situation. The MLRO 
Assistant reinforces this idea by saying “Any atypical or out of common situation, or that 
corresponds to a set of typologies of risk and eventual indications of money laundering are 
reported”. By doing this, there is a mitigation of risk and uncertainty and a higher sense of 
security. An example given for this situation was the return of Portuguese workers from 
Angola for Christmas holidays. In Angola, it is difficult to transfer money to Portugal due to 
the political and economic situation, so the individuals make large cash deposits in 
Portuguese agencies. When it happened for the first time, the first person to do this was 
considered suspicious. In that moment, a mechanism to ask for justification was adopted. 
When it was possible to start identifying a pattern, it ceased from being an occasional 
situation, to be a typology of operations that needed to be controlled better. 
Another take away from the interviews was that the compliance officers feel a threat 
of insecurity and instability in their personal and professional lives. This argument can be 
proven by the statements of an employee from the compliance department, “Working in 
compliance is an ungrateful position. (…) it is a misunderstood job. (…) It is a kind of job 




ungrateful job because everyone misbehaves [including other departments of the bank and 
criminals], but if something wrong happens the blame falls on the compliance department”. 
The same employee, sometimes considered this to be a job that might be “(…) demotivating. 
It can bring dissatisfaction. Notice that this is an activity in which nothing that you do well is 
valued, but when something wrong happens, you are going to be judged by it, knowing 
beforehand that, due to the high volume of transactions, you would not be able to detect and 
prevent all of them”. Moreover, according to the MLRO Assistant, “Socially, people are 
convinced that the fight against money laundering is responsibility of the financial 
institutions”. This brings up an issue of social pressure that the compliance professional have 
to endure. 
In this sense, there is a feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction, which is difficult to be 
avoided. A possible way of addressing this issue would be with the creation of a new entity 
that manage the activity of compliance and protects and regulates the interests of the 
compliance officers. As there is the Ordem dos Contabilistas Certificados and the Ordem dos 
Revisores Oficiais de Contas, a new entity could be created to provide the same service but 
with the objective of regulating and managing the compliance activity and the professionals’ 
careers. 
In Portugal, there is clearly a preference for rules, especially when we talk about the 
prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing. As the MLRO 
Assistant states, “Personally, I think everyone feels more comfortable in the presence of rules 
since that decreases unpredictability. Presumably, if I follow the rules, everyone else will also 
follow them and there is a bigger comfort and predictability in the behaviour of my 
competitors. That is one of the reasons why the existence of rules is important. However, it is 
dangerous when one sticks to the rules. (…)”. Although subject entities would prefer a more 
specific regulation in order to decrease the risk from their side and to prevent them from 
finding themselves in a disadvantageous position when comparing to their competitors, the 
current regulations allow for flexibility when unexpected situations appear. 
So far, there is evidence to prove that the above-mentioned dimensions influence the 
prevention and detection of money laundering crimes. However, Hofstede has identified six 
dimensions. The conducted interviews do not show evidence to support the hypothesis that 




Indulgence vs Restraint have an impact on the prevention and detection of money laundering 
and terrorist financing crimes. 
When it comes to Masculinity vs Femininity, it was not possible to identify one 
dominant dimension in the department. This dimension attributes values associated with 
masculinity and femininity to different cultures. Characteristics associated with masculinity 
are aggressiveness and dominance, and in societies that score high in masculinity, there is a 
strong emphasis on achievement, growth and challenge in jobs. In these cultures, people tend 
to be more assertive and not showing as much concern for individual needs and feelings. 
There is also a higher concern for job performance. On the other hand, in societies strong in 
the feminine dimension, factors like working conditions, job satisfaction and employee 
participation are more valued.  
Portugal has a low score of 31 on Masculinity. This means that its culture is more 
driven by feminine stereotypes. In this type of cultures consensus is important and it is 
reached through involvement. Polarization or excessive competitiveness are not well 
received. Managers strive for consensus, people value equality, solidarity and quality in their 
working lives. Conflict is managed by compromising and negotiating. People favour 
incentives such as free time and flexibility, and the focus is on well-being, not status. 
However, within the department it was not possible to identify a dominant dimension.  
Regarding Long-term vs Short-term Orientation, it reflects how a culture positions 
itself in what concerns the future. Long-term oriented cultures are more concerned with the 
future, and they plan for the long-term, giving importance to their savings and persistence. 
On the other hand, short-term oriented cultures give more value to the present and show more 
concern about answering to their social obligations. With a low score of 28, Portugal shows 
that there is a preference for a normative rather than pragmatic thought. Portuguese people 
have a strong concern with establishing the truth, and show a great respect for tradition. They 
also show a small propensity for accumulating savings and are focused on achieving quick 
results. 
One of the characteristics that is associated with countries with a strong long-term 
orientation is the importance given to training. In the studied department, the training given to 
employees receives great attention. However, this training is considered important because 




creating new ways to hide the origin of the illicit proceeds and terrorist financiers create new 
channels to hide the destination of the funds. As one of the employees of the department said, 
“This [detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing] is a little bit like 
play cat and mouse with the criminals, they adapt to us and we adapt to them”. Therefore, the 
purpose of this training is to solve problems in the short-term and to help the professionals 
working in the compliance department to perform better, rather than an investment in the 
long-term. 
The final analysed dimension was Indulgence vs Restraint. According to this 
dimension, an indulgent society is one that allows relatively free gratification of basic and 
natural core human drivers related to enjoying life and having fun. One example of this 
would be a society where an individual feels more predisposed to buy himself/herself a treat 
after accomplishing a goal. On the other hand, a restrained society is one that suppresses the 
above-mentioned gratifications, regulating them by using strict social norms. 
With a score of 33 on Indulgence, Portugal is considered a restrained country. There 
is a tendency for cynicism and pessimism in these cultures. Cultures characterized by 
restraint do not put much emphasis on leisure time and control the gratification of their 
desires. People with this orientation have the perception that their actions are restrained by 
social norms and feel that indulging themselves is somewhat wrong. However, the results of 
the interviews do not show evidence that this dimension affects the detection and prevention 
of money laundering in this organization. 
As mentioned before, the results of this study show evidence that three of the 
dimensions defined by Hofstede, have an impact in the detection and prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing in this department. However, it was not possible to find 
evidence to support and show influence of the other dimensions, to which I leave the space 






From the previous chapter it is possible to draw some conclusions and suggest 
managerial contributions that might help this financial institution to address its weaknesses 
and improve its strengths (Figure 5). From the six dimensions studied, three of them have 
influence in the prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes 
in the studied entity. These dimensions influence the processes of the compliance department 
at different levels. 
Starting with Collectivism vs Individualism, it has a special influence in how the 
individuals in this department communicate with each other. Being a collectivistic 
department and because this characteristic is essential to perform this activity, a high degree 
of communication can be seen. 
 When it comes to Power Distance, it is possible to verify the presence of this 
dimension within the department, except for one situation. In general, there is acceptance to 
the differences in power and status according to the different levels of hierarchy, leading to a 
more efficient information flow and more agile decision-making. However, despite the 
specialist in the subject of detection and prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing not being the person on the top of the hierarchy, this individual is present in the 
decision whether to report or not to the authorities. This shows a good balance between 
acceptance of differences in power and status and organizational structure. 
Finally, Uncertainty Avoidance is a dimension that shows a great influence in the 
prevention and detection of the crimes under study. It was possible to conclude that, like in 
the Portuguese society in general, this department has a great preference for well-defined and 
comprehensive rules. With the existence of rules imposed by the regulating authorities, the 
compliance department is able to minimize the underlying risks. 
 After analysing the structure and history of this compliance department, from a 
cultural perspective, it is possible to conclude that it has a strong and solid system of 
prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. The 
collectivistic culture and the acceptance for the differences in power and status, according to 




flow is facilitated by the high communication culture developed inside the department and 
the well-defined path that the information should follow. This flow also enables a more 
inclusive and participative decision-making that is important in this activity. On top of this, 
the department shows other strengths. More precisely, the large level of knowledge, expertise 
and experience that the professionals show. 
However, and because this is an activity with volatility and a constant need of 
adaptation, there are some points of improvement. For starters, as stated during the 
interviews, due to the enormous amount of transactions that are processed by this financial 
institution, it is extremely difficult to detect and prevent every attempt of money laundering 
and terrorist financing. Money launderers and terrorist financiers are always finding new 
ways of achieving their ends. There is a constant adaptation from both sides (subject entities 
and competent authorities vs criminals). If criminals are always adapting and inventing new 
ways of laundering money and finance terrorist activities, the same is true to subject entities 
and competent authorities, who are always trying to identify new typologies and means that 
criminals use to achieve their ends. It is especially important for subject entities to detect as 
many suspect cases as possible in order to minimize the risks inherent with the non-detection 
of the same. By not being able to detect every case, subject entities are open to the threats 
penalization from the competent authorities and reputational risks.  
Even though some operations are impossible to identify as being a possible case of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, in the future, those cases might come out to the 
public and be discovered. When those cases are identified, it is easy to link them to the 
preceding operations that led to them. However, when the compliance department evaluated 
those operations, it was not possible to link them to a possible case of money laundering or 
terrorist financing. Despite not being able to identify those operations, the subject entities 
through which they were done, will take the blame, possibly incurring in penalizations from 
the competent authorities and from reputational damage. This inability to identify every 
suspect operations leads to an increase of uncertainty of the activity, which consequently 
leads to a feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction among compliance professionals. The 
compliance activity is not being supervised by an entity that can manage and regulate the 
activity as well as manage the professionals’ careers.  
In general, there is a reasonable degree of complexity regarding the law, that adding 




is present in the culture of this department, creates a set of weaknesses that need to be 
addressed. Based on these points of improvement, suggestions to help improve these 
situations will be provided 
 The first suggestion is the continuation of the effort to create measures that support 
internal dialogue and collaboration, within the compliance department. As stated during the 
interviews, communication is essential for the effectiveness and efficiency of this activity. 
Therefore, it should be something that should be given incentive to. By encouraging 
communication, more suspect operations can be identified and this process can be more 
effective and efficient. 
As mentioned in the interviews, there is a constant adaptation from the subject entities 
to the criminals and their ways to operate. The compliance department under study only has a 
reactive stance towards criminals. However, by trying to predict new ways in which criminals 
can launder the proceeds from the crimes they commit or to fund terrorist organizations, the 
process of prevention and detection can be complemented. Therefore, my second suggestion 
is the creation of a position in the compliance department, whose responsibilities are to 
complement the mechanisms of prevention and detection, by studying possible flaws or new 
means that can be used by criminals to achieve their goals. This way, the department would 
be taking a pro-active approach to tackle the problem, on top of the reactive one that is 
already pursued. The goal of this pro-active approach is to reduce the risk and uncertainty 
since it will lead to news typologies to be discovered and reduce unpredictability. 
The final suggestion’s objective is to face the issue of the feeling of insecurity that 
sometimes compliance professionals face. No matter what, uncertainty and risk are two 
characteristics that are always present in the compliance activity, thus, it is impossible to 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Information flow 
 Participative and inclusive 
decision making 
 Knowledge and Expertise 
 Experienced professionals 
 Inability to detect all the suspect 
operations 
 Feeling of insecurity that leads to 
dissatisfaction towards the job 





eliminate them. However, the impact that these problems have in the performance of the 
compliance activity can be softened. With the impact that these characteristics have in the 
compliance professionals in mind, by bringing a feeling of insecurity that culminates in 
dissatisfaction of the same professionals, the creation of an entity to manage and help 
regulate the compliance activity can provide an extenuation of this distress. 
This new entity would exercise its activity in the same base as organizations like the 
Ordem dos Contabilistas Certificados (OCC) and the Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de 
Contas (OROC) and would also operate in Portugal. Like the mentioned organizations, the 
new entity should be established by government ministerial order and be approved by 
Decree-Law. The objective of the new organization is to manage and help regulate the 
compliance activity, as well as manage the professionals’ careers. Therefore, the main 
responsibilities of the organization are: the registry of statutory compliance professionals; 
conducting access exams to the profession; ensure that the Compliance professionals have a 
proper and continuous education; the elaboration and update of the Principles and Standards 
of the code of professional ethics and conduct; define and update the standards and technical 
procedures of the profession, taking into consideration the international standards; and 
perform quality control reviews of its members. 
With these responsibilities in mind, the new organization will be an element that 
provides protection to the interests of its members. The conduction of exams of access and 
the registration in this organization can have a role of certification of the professional’s 
capabilities to perform the compliance activity. On top of this, the quality of the professionals 
has to be assured. Thus, it is important to provide training and information updates to the 
compliance officers. This training and information updates can be done through sessions, 
workshops, discussion forums, divulgation of new legislation and biographies, conferences 
and meetings. 
This does not mean that only professionals registered in this organization can work in 
compliance. However, only the professionals that are certified by this entity can underwrite 
the communications sent to the competent authorities. On top of this, by being registered the 
professional has access to benefits that would not have otherwise. The registered 
professionals would have access to an insurance plan that includes health, life and civil 
responsibility. They would also constitute a group of experts that is able to give technical and 





It is true that the dimensions defined by Hofstede have an impact in the detection and 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. However, there are other 
issues conditioning the detection and prevention of these crimes. These issues are present in 
different areas of the organization and should be addressed in different ways. 
The main issue is the conflict of interests that financial institutions face. This conflict 
of interests originates from the fact that employees of this institution are evaluated based on 
their performance and their performance depends on the results obtained. However, in some 
cases, in order to achieve those results, the institution’s agents might overlook some 
suspicious operations without applying the necessary prevention mechanisms. The problem 
comes from the lack of awareness from those employees of the importance of fighting crimes 
like money laundering and terrorist financing and the absence of incentives to fight these 
hazards. This gains special importance since these agents are the first in the organization to 
confront these situations. As suggested by the MLRO Assistant, “Socially, there is no stimuli 
for the agents to understand that, in reality, there is no conflict of interests. (…) The problem 
lies in the fact that they do not have the perception of the problem that they are facing. (…) In 
the short-term, there seems to exist a conflict of interests because they are pursuing the 
required results, but in the long-run it is not like that”. In this case, focusing on short-term 
results poses a threat to the organization since is leaves the institutions more prone to the 
consequences of not being able to detect and prevent these crimes. 
This specific problem leads to inefficiencies when it comes to detect and prevent 
money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. On the one hand, it leads to a higher 
necessity for the compliance department to be concerned with every operation because it 
means that there is a diminished support from other departments of the organization. On the 
other hand, the agents are the ones who better know the clients. Therefore, they are the ones 
in the best position to suspect of some operations. If this support existed, the prevention and 
detection mechanisms would be more efficient. As the MLRO Assistant explained, “The 
operational departments should perceive that money laundering and terrorist financing is also 
a matter of their concern. (…) Without intending to pass all the responsibility to them, they 
are the front-line soldiers and if there is any problem, they should also answer. (…) That 




One possible solution for the problem can be a change in the performance parameters 
used to evaluate the employees that are responsible for the operational part of the business. 
This would work as an attempt to raise awareness of the importance of fighting money 
laundering and terrorist financing and the role of the operational departments in this fight. 
The MLRO Assistant shares this opinion that “This conflict exists in the immediate. 
Culturally, in the performance evaluation systems of commercial objectives, evaluation 
parameters do not reflect their role in complying. (…) If this [the implementation of new 
evaluation parameters] does not work, an extreme solution would be using repression and 
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Appendix I – FAFT recommendations summary 
A. Policies and coordination regarding the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorism financing 
1) Risk evaluation and use of a risk based approach 
2) Nacional cooperation and coordination 
B. Money laundering and confiscation 
1) Criminalization of Money Laundering 
2) Confiscation and provisional measures 
C. Terrorist financing and proliferation financing 
1) Terrorist financing offense 
2) Specific financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing 
3) Specific financial sanctions related to proliferation 
4) Nonprofit Organizations 
D. Preventive measures 
1) Rules on professional secrecy of financial institutions 
2) Customer due diligence  
3) Document preservation 
4) Politically exposed people 
5) Corresponding banks 
6) Money transfer services 
7) New technologies 
8) Electronic transfers 
9) Appeal to third parties 
10) Internal controls and branches and subsidiaries abroad 
11) Countries with higher behavioural risk 
12) Declaration of suspicious transactions 
13) Customer Alert and Confidentiality 
14) Designated non-financial activities and professions: customer due diligence 




E. Transparency and effective beneficiaries of legal persons and entities without 
legal personality 
1) Transparency and effective beneficiaries of legal persons 
2) Transparency and effective beneficiaries of entities without legal personality 
F. Powers and responsibilities of competent authorities and other institutional 
measures 
1) Regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
2) Powers of supervisory authorities 
3) Regulation and supervision of non-financial activities and designated 
professions 
4) Financial information units 
5) Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigating authorities 
6) Powers of law enforcement and investigation authorities 
7) Fund conveyors 
8) Statistics 
9) Guidance and feedback 
10) Sanctions 
G. International cooperation 
1) International instruments 
2) Mutual legal aid 
3) Mutual legal aid: freezing and loss 
4) Extradition 






Appendix II - Portuguese Law for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
summary: Lei nº 25/2008, de 05 de Junho: Lei do Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais 
e do Financiamento ao Terrorismo. 
1. Duty of identification 
 Require and verify the identity of clients and their representatives; 
 When they suspect operations that may be related to money laundering or 
terrorist financing. 
2. Duty of diligence 
 Take appropriate measures to understand the structure of ownership and 
control of the client, whether it is a legal person or a collective interest center 
without legal personality; 
 Obtaining information about the intended purpose and nature of the business 
relationship; 
 Get information when the customer's risk profile or the characteristics of the 
transaction so require, on the origin and destination of the funds moved within 
a business relationship or occasional transaction; 
 Maintain continuous monitoring of the business relationship to ensure that 
such transactions are consistent with the entity's knowledge of the client's 
activities and risk profile; 
 Keep updated the information elements obtained during the course of the 
business relationship. 
3. Duty of refusal 
 Where the elements provided for in the duty of identification are not provided 
or the information provided in the duty of diligence is not provided, the 
subject entities shall refuse to: 
o Perform any operation; 
o Start a business relationship; 
o Perform any occasional transaction. 




 Copies or references to documents proving compliance with the duty of 
identification and due diligence, as well as records of operations, shall be kept 
for a period of seven years. 
5. Duty of examination 
 Subject entities shall examine with special care and attention any conduct, 
activity or operation that may be related to money laundering or terrorist 
financing. 
6. Duty of communication 
 The subject entities must immediately inform the Attorney General and the 
Financial Intelligence Unit whenever they know, suspect or have sufficient 
reasons that it has taken place, is under way or has been attempted an 
operation capable of forming the practice of the crime of money laundering or 
terrorist financing. 
7. Duty of abstention 
 The entities subject must abstain from carrying out operations that they know 
or suspect to be related to the practice of money laundering or terrorist 
financing crimes and immediately inform the Attorney General and the 
Financial Intelligence Unit. 
o If the Criminal Investigation Judge does not confirm the suspension 
order in two working days, the operation can be carried out. 
8. Duty of collaboration 
 Subject entities shall promptly provide the assistance required by the Attorney 
General and the Financial Intelligence Unit for the performance of their duties, 
in particular by ensuring direct access to the information and by submitting the 
requested documents or records. 
o The collaboration of the entities with the authorities and the 
consequent reporting of suspicious communications is exclusively 
done in the context of the prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, and under Lei n.º 25/2008, de 5 de Junho. 
9. Duty of secrecy 
 The entities and their collaborators may not disclose to the client or third 
parties, that they transmitted the communications legally owed or that a 




10. Duty of control 
 In order to effectively prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, 
subject entities shall define and implement internal policies and procedures in 
respect of: 
o Internal control; 
o Risk assessment and management; 
o Internal audit. 
11. Duty of training 
 The subject entities must take the necessary measures to ensure that managers 
and employees, whose functions are relevant to the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, have an adequate knowledge of the 







Appendix III – Money Laundering typologies, indicators and subject entities 
Typologies: 
 Several cash deposits in small amounts 
 Re-sale of luxury goods 
 International complex financial  operations 
 Financial operations related to offshores 
General Indicators: 
 Frequent address change 
 Curiosity about internal systems, controls, procedures and reporting 
 Not very realist, confusing or inconsistent explanation of transactions or activities 
Cash Indicators: 
 Opening of accounts where credit movement is done exclusively in cash deposits 
 Frequent usage of ATM 
 High number of low amount cash deposits 
 Large deposits in cash 
 Large transactions of from/to a foreign country 
Deposit Indicators: 
 Deposits made in several locations and in several moments without a logical reason 
 Accounts that can be accessed and moved by a high number of entities without a 
logical reason 
 Accounts that are only used to transfer funds 
 Clients that do no claim nor negotiate returns that are beneficial for them 
Transfer Indicators: 
 Online movements from/to high risk geographical zones 
 Client knows very little information about the recipient of the order of payment, or is 




 Transfers done to/from jurisdictions fiscally more favourable, without commercial  





Appendix IV – Interviews protocol 
1. Could you explain the structure of the Compliance department?  
a. How many employees work in the department? 
b. Could you explain the information flow process in the department? 
i. Who is responsible for identifying suspect operations? 
ii. Who is responsible for the reporting to the authorities? 
iii. What mechanisms do you use to identify suspect operations? 
2. Are you required to consult your co-workers? 
3. Before making the final decision (whether to report or not), do you consult your co-
workers? 
a. Do you only do it when you consider the situation to be of a more difficult 
analysis? 
4. In which situations do you consult your colleagues? 
5. Do you consider helpful being able to consult your co-workers? 
6. Do your co-workers usually offer their help, without you asking for it? 
7. Do you usually offer your help, without being asked for it? 
8. Do you conform to your boss’ orders? 
9. Would you be more in favour of a flatter hierarchy or not? Why? 
10. How often do you report to your boss? 
11. Do you usually go to him when you have concerns regarding the detection of 
suspicious operations? If not, why so? 
12. Are you satisfied with your working conditions? 
13. Do you share the same space as your boss? 
14. How do you communicate with your boss? 
15. Do you consider the law to be clear? 
16. Do you  consider the internal mechanisms to be clear? 
17. Do you usually do only what is required of you, or do you try to go the extra mile, 
even though it is not required? 
18. How would you react to a situation that was not predicted? 
19. Would you feel more comfortable if the rules are already set, or if you could be free to 
do the procedures your own way? 




21. How do you manage conflicts? 
22. Whenever in doubt do you report right away? Or take time to think? 
23. Would you rather maximize the efficiency of the reporting system or the process? 
(More focused in the outcome or the means to achieve that outcome?) 
24. Do you see your job as a challenge you want to win? 
25. Do you think that a good relationship with your co-workers in necessary in order to 
have a good performance at your job? 
26. What kind of training do you receive? 
a. Before the implementation or after? 
27. Do you have certification 
28. How do you plan your work? (As it comes/Daily/Weekly/Monthly) 
29. Have you ever admitted that you have made a mistake while working? 
30. When you make a mistake, do you take the blame? 
31. Do you usually work extra hours? 
32. Does this organization have any code of conduct? 
a. Does it only focus on the compliance department? 
b. In your opinion, is that code in agreement with the ethical principles of the 
society you are inserted? 
c. Do you agree with the code? 
33. In your opinion, to what extent might the current legislation be excessive? 
34. Would you agree that it is lacking the existence of an external organization to manage 
and regulate the compliance activity? 
 
